The part concerning the main trends in international migration is presented in four sections. The first (I.A) looks at changes in migration movements and in the foreign population of the OECD member countries. The second Section (I.B) focuses on the position of immigrants in the labour market. The third (I.C) sheds particular light on two regionsAsia and Central and Eastern Europe. This is followed by an overview of migration policies (I.D), which reviews policies to regulate and control flows, along with the full range of measures to enhance the integration of immigrants and developments in cooperation at international level in the area of migration. In addition, the issue of the integration of immigrants into host-country societies is highlighted in theme boxes to be found in Part I.
A. MIGRATION AND POPULATION TRENDS
Over the past two decades, trends in migratory flows and in the levels of foreign and foreign-born populations in OECD member countries have reversed course on several occasions. These reversals have resulted from major regional geopolitical upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe, but in Asia and Africa as well. They are also tied in with the important changes -both legislative (amendments to the conditions of entry and residence of foreigners, naturalisation, and so on) and economic -that have taken place in a number of host countries. These changes have resulted in broad contrasts in the dynamics of migratory flows, the main sending countries and the profiles of immigrants.
Trends in migration movements and changes in the foreign population
During the 1980s and early 90s, immigration flows intensified, spurred both by the opening up of Eastern Europe and the rapid economic development of a number of Asian countries. The trend was reversed in 1992-93, in part because of efforts by the main receiving countries to tighten controls over migratory flows. From that time on, and until at least 1997, entries of foreign nationals dropped significantly despite the persistence of family migration and arrivals of asylum seekers, due in part to the closing of other channels of immigration and a new flare-up of regional conflicts.
The resumption of immigration in the OECD countries, which has been perceptible since the late 1990s, was confirmed and tended to gather pace in 2000 and 2001. It results primarily from greater migration by foreign workers, both temporary and permanent. Conditions for recruiting skilled foreign labour have been eased in most of the OECD member countries in order to meet labour market needs, especially in the new technologies and health care sectors.
In 2002, under the combined effects of the technology bust and the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States, OECD-area countries were unable to escape recession. That recession, even if it may be only short-lived and of moderate intensity, has nonetheless helped to ease the tightness of labour markets and to limit business recruitment requirements, including the need for skilled workers. Even so, it is difficult to gauge the impact of those events on the international mobility of persons, or to predict whether they will reverse the trend in immigration flows.
a) Migratory trends very clearly on the rise
In 2000 and the first half of 2001, the increased inflows that had been observed since 1996-97 continued in a great many OECD countries (see Chart I.1) . This phenomenon, more pronounced in the non-European OECD countries, still remained moderate within the European Union as a whole, since EU immigration rose by only 3.2% between to the stocks of foreign-born residents (1996 Census for Canada). Sources: National Statistical Offices (for more details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Statistical Annex). to the stocks of foreign-born residents (1996 Census for Canada). Sources: National Statistical Offices (for more details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Statistical Annex). The left-hand side of Chart I.1 shows the trend in foreign migrant inflows since 1980. The host countries are divided into four groups, in decreasing order of the volume of their 2000 inflows. The righthand side of the chart shows the volume of inflows in absolute terms, and as a proportion of the total population and the stock of foreigners in each country.
In the United States, the change in inflows was s pe ct acu lar be tween 1999 an d 2000. N early 850 000 new permanent immigrants were admitted in 2000, up more than 30% from the previous year. This dynamic is in clear contrast to what had happened in the three previous years, and the main explanation for it is the fact that major efforts were made to reduce the number of pending applications. For 2001, it is expected that over a million permanent entries will have been recorded, which would constitute an all-time high, excluding the figures for 1990 and 1991, which incorporated amnesties under the IRCA programme.
Growth in the inflows of foreigners was just as sharp in Japan, where 346 000 persons settled in 2000, up almost 23% from the previous year and the highest level in decades. The significance of this is heightened by the fact that it came at a time when the Japanese economy was gripped by the recession that began in August 2000, with unemployment at an unprecedented level (5% in 2001). Much of this increased inflow is attributable to returns of descendants of Japanese, mostly from Brazil, and to entries of Chinese and Philippine citizens.
In Canada, the rise in permanent immigration, perceptible in 1999, continued and gathered pace in 2000, since 227 000 persons settled in Canada that year, or nearly 20% more than in 1999. The figure for 2001 will be even higher, probably exceeding 250 000 entries. In the early 1990s, similar levels had been reached (256 000 in 1993) and had constituted all-time highs. The Canadian authorities have stated their determination to increase immigration gradually, so that inflows amount to roughly 1% of the total population, which for 2001 was estimated at over 30 million.
Box I.1. Migration statistics: definitions and comparability 1 International migration statistics are patchy, of varying degrees of reliability, and subject to problems of comparability. These difficulties stem largely from the diversity of migration systems and legislation on nationality and naturalisation, which reflect the individual history and circumstances of each country. For example, in settlement countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), immigrants are classified by their place of birth ("foreign-born"), while in the other OECD member countries the criterion of nationality is applied ("foreigners"). Some international organisations, in particular the UN, have recommended adopting a common definition of the concept of international migrant, but implementing these recommendations is fraught with numerous difficulties.
The main sources of information on migration vary across countries, which poses difficulties for the comparability of available data. Some countries (notably northern European ones) keep population registers, while others base their statistics on records of residence and work permits issued to foreign nationals or, in the case of workers, on information provided by social security systems. There are also data from censuses, and from surveys on the various characteristics of the population. In some cases, other sources may be used, such as specific surveys on migrants, border-crossing records, disembarkation cards, studies on staff mobility in multinational enterprises, etc.
Despite these difficulties, this report and, more generally, all OECD activities in the field of international migration are aimed precisely at improving the availability, comparability and reliability of data. These activities are based largely on a network of national correspondents in thirty four countries (see the list of correspondents in the Annex) and seek to enhance analysis and understanding of migration issues in the light of the socioeconomic challenges facing OECD member countries.
1. For further details on migration statistics, see the Statistical Annex.
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Certain countries in southern Europe that do not necessarily possess comprehensive and accurate statistics on inflows also noted a significant rise in immigration in the late 1990s. This is the case of Portugal, for example, but also of Spain and Greece, both of which had instituted unprecedented legalisation campaigns, involving in all more than a million and a half people in just a few years (see below, Section I.D on migration policies).
In 2000, immigration also increased appreciably in several other OECD member countries, including the Netherlands (+16.6%), the United Kingdom (+13.6%), Finland (+15.2%), Ireland (+11.6%), France (+10.3%) and Australia (+9.7%). In contrast, the trend was more moderate in other European countries characterised by sharply rising immigration in the late 1990s (as in Italy and Belgium). Inflows of foreigners declined in Germany, Austria and a number of Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden in particular). In Germany, in 2000, about 649 000 new immigrants were recorded -down by half from the level reached in 1992 and well below the yearly average for the latter half of the 1990s. Even so, in absolute terms, Germany was still the secondranking host amongst the OECD member countries.
The OECD countries can be divided into two groups, according to recent trends in migratory flows. First is a group of countries in which immigration flows peaked significantly in 2000, continuing a more or less buoyant trend. This was the case of Japan, as mentioned above, but also of many European countries for which the rise in flows was more moderate in 2000, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom. For all of these countries, the number of foreigners taken in was the highest in twenty years. Other countries which would appear to have reached a "maximum" in 1998 or 1999 can also be put in with this group, namely Austria, Luxembourg, Norway and France. The latest statistics available for the United States and Canada would suggest that those countries will also have hit record high inflows in 2001.
In reality, only a handful of countries for which data are available over a long period truly stand out in that the record immigration flows of the late 1980s or early 90s remain unequalled to this day. Those countries are Germany, Australia and Switzerland, in addition to the Nordic countries, except for Norway. Elsewhere, however, the trend in inflows of foreigners appears to be more stable, and immigration is far from its record levels. In Germany and Sweden, there has even been a steady decline in entries of foreign citizens. This observation needs to be qualified, however, for certain countries (Australia and Germany) by the fact that temporary labour migration has been trending firmly upward (see Section I.A.1.c below).
If inflows of foreigners have been rising in most of the OECD member countries, the same is actually tru e o f ou tfl o w s (se e the Stati s ti c al An ne x, Table A.1.2). Without calling the previous findings into question, the trends in the net migration of foreigners and the foreign-born appear to be more moderate, at least in countries for which detailed statistics are available. However, net migration of foreigners dropped by nearly 27% in Germany between 1999 and 2000, while increasing, for example, by more than 22% in the Netherlands over the same period (see Section I.A.2.a below for an analysis of total net migration).
Recent migration trends have brought little change to the ranking of the main immigration countries, though some differences have widened slightly (see the right-hand part of Chart I.1). For example, in 2000, the United Kingdom took in some 30 000 persons more than Japan, and 150 000 more than Canada. On the basis of absolute values, however, the United States (849 400) and Germany (648 800) continued to be the two main immigration countries. For France, Australia, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the number of persons taken in ranged from 120 000 to 87 000. Italy confirmed its p o s i t io n b e t w e e n C a n a d a a n d J a p a n w i t h 271 000 entries in 2000.
If these legal inflows are compared to the total foreign or immigrant population at the beginning of the year, the ranking changes somewhat. Japan then ranks first, ahead of Italy and Ireland, with ratios of between 20.5% and 19%, followed by the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, Hungary and Finland, for which the ratios range from 16% to 10%.
It is particularly hard to predict whether these trends will continue, given that in 2001 economic activity suffered a number of cyclical shocks. However, the partial data available for 2001 seem to confirm the rise reported in 1999 and 2000. In southern Europe, it can be expected, on the basis of demographic trends and labour requirements, that migration pressure will persist in the coming years. In the medium term, settlement by recent waves of migrants may generate further inflows of immigrants to these countries for family reasons, thereby making © OECD 2003 them more significant immigration countries. At the same time, the other OECD countries, despite the economic turndown, have not rescinded the easing of conditions for the admission of skilled foreign workers, suggesting that the rise in employment-related migration in the late 1990s will not be jeopardised for long. The case of Germany, which plans a radical overhaul of its immigration legislation in response to labour market needs, and that of Canada, which has proclaimed its determination to make active use of immigration to preserve its medium-and long-term economic and demographic dynamics, are just two examples of this.
Nevertheless, controlling migration flows remains a priority common to all OECD countries, with special emphasis on curbing illegal immigration and the growing number of asylum seekers. On the whole, migration flows, classified by main categories, have been marked over the last two years by the continuing preponderance of family-linked immigration, greater numbers of asylum seekers and, above all, an increase in employment-related migration.
b) An increasingly contrasting breakdown by category of inflows
Previous editions of Trends in International Migration have highlighted changes in the breakdown of immigration flows by category since the early 1990s. In particular, family-linked immigration (accompanying family members and family reunification) has increased in Australia, the United States, France and Sweden, while immigration for employment has risen in Canada and the United Kingdom and the refugee category has grown in the Nordic countries. Recently, however, the rise in worker migration has been the most salient feature in most of the receiving countries.
These trends are not uniform, however, and they reflect the effects of the migration policies, active or not, implemented by the countries in question. Some countries explicitly give priority to foreign workers (Australia, the United Kingdom and Switzerland), while others, such as Canada, seek a more stable distribution amongst categories. A number of other OECD countries, because they apply policies that are more restrictive, give implicit priority to non-selective migration arising from family reunification or requests for asylum (France and the Nordic countries).
Even if it varied sharply from one country to another, the family component still dominated in several OECD countries in 2000; this was especially so in France, the United States and Canada (see Chart I.2). The share allotted to this category continues to grow in some countries in which other official channels of immigration still remain limited. In France, family-related immigration rose by 22% as compared to 1999, reaching 78% of inflows -the highest level ever reached. As a percentage of total entries, France takes in more family members than any other OECD country. In the Nordic countries, this component of migration is also on the rise. It should also be noted that family members who get permanent resident status are often granted the right to work.
In 2000, it was in Sweden and Norway that refugees accounted for the largest share of total immigration flows (at respectively 41% and 38%). This share was also large in Denmark (24%), even if the percentage was down somewhat on 1999. It must be made clear, however, that the data in Chart I.2 refer only to asylum seekers who obtained refugee status during the year in question and do not include asylum seekers whose applications were still pending.
Inflows of workers increased in 2000 in all of the countries considered, except for Norway. They rose by only 3% in France, but by 18% in Denmark, 25% in the United Kingdom, 29% in Sweden and 88% in the United States. Labour migration accounted in 2000, in the selected countries, for the highest percentage of total inflows in Australia, Portugal, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, the proportion exceeding 50% in the first three of these countries.
The case of Australia is remarkable in that changes in the conditions for entry caused inflows of foreign workers to increase by more than 16% over the previous year, while entries associated with family reunification and refugees declined by 7% and 17% respectively. This trend testifies to the Australian authorities' determination to encourage migration that is apt to be of short-or medium-term benefit to the economy. Portugal's case is quite different, illustrating the situation of a country in which the migratory phenomenon is a recent one. The ma ke-up of flows is destined to change, however, as newly settled workers send for their families. Similar patterns can be seen in other southern European countries, such as Italy and Spain.
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c) Growth in employment-related migration
One of the most significant trends in recent years has been the rise in permanent, but especi al ly temp orary, mi gration f or em pl oyment purposes. In 2000, this trend continued and was accentuated despite the economic slowdown in the second half of the year. It is the result of a combination of several factors involving the intensity of the expansion phase that marked the latter half of the 1990s and the dawn of the 21st century, as well as the development of the information technology sector, for which in some countries there is a shortage of skilled and highly skilled workers (see Part II below).
In this context, there is heightened competition between OECD member countries to attract the human resources they lack, and to keep those individuals who might be tempted to emigrate. Accordingly, in the late 1990s a large number of countries changed their laws to facilitate the entry of skil led foreig n w ork ers. These leg isla tiv e changes are set forth in detail in the 2001 edition of the report on Trends in International Migration.
In 2000 and 2001, far from abandoning their easing of restrictions, a number of member countries introduced new regulations further encouraging the mobility of highly skilled workers (see Section I.D below on migration policies). One example is the United Kingdom, which created a new type of visa allowing highly qualified persons, selected on the basis of a point system, to enter the United Kingdom to seek work. A similar programme was also instituted in Norway. The same is also true of Canada, which in June 2002 amended its point-based selection system so that candidates likely to find a stable place in the labour market are identified more clearly.
In Germany, the quota of 10 000 computer specialists introduced under the Green Card programme was extended (20 000 visas are available until 2003). In addition, the German government voted in favour of a thorough reform of the immigration legislation to facilitate the entry of highly skilled workers who have been offered jobs paying more than € 75 000 a year. Under a second entry procedure, skilled workers will go through a point system-based selection process modelled on the Canadian system. Unlike the first procedure, this second channel of entry will be subject to a quota, but it will not require that applicants already be in possession of a job offer.
The special measures that the OECD countries have implemented for IT and telecommunications specialists led to the recruitment of 8 700 persons in Germany between August 2000 and August 2001, nearly 2 600 in France in 2000 (4 000 in 2001) and m o re th an 2 7 00 i n C a na d a un d e r th e p i l o t programme for computer specialists. In the United States, nearly 163 000 H1B visas were granted in 2001, many of which in the information and communication technologies sector, out of a quota of 195 000. Even though the quota was not filled for the first time since 1997, the numbers were still up significantly from 2000, when 115 000 H1B visas had been issued -despite the fact that new exemptions (admissions not subject to the quota) had been introduced, e.g. to recruit staff for research centres and universities.
While specialists in the new technologies have been the primary beneficiaries of the recent easing of visa requirements, the measures have applied to other categories of skilled workers as well, and more particularly to doctors, nurses and nurses' aides. While in most countries it is the employers who find and recruit qualified computer experts, the situation differs in the health care sector. Equivalency issues and knowledge of the host country's language are crucial to employment in this sector, which is fully or partially controlled by government.
The OECD member countries have adopted different recruiting strategies, most of them trying to attract nurses and doctors from countries awarding professional credentials that are recognised, and where the official language is the same as the host country's. For its part, Norway has endeavoured to recruit health care professionals from other European countries, but candidates must learn Norwegian before they can be accepted in the country. The United Kingdom and France recently signed bilateral agreements with Spain, which trains a greater number of nurses, to facilitate the mobility of Spanish nurses. The language issue, and the working conditions on offer, have so far limited the scope of these initiatives. The Netherlands has looked to its former colonies as a special source of qualified health care professionals, although there is concern in some circles over the brain drain effects on small countries like Surinam. In contrast to the computer sector, where this phenomenon is not considered important, international recruitment of doctors and nurses has been critici sed. South A fri ca has opposed the active recruitment of its health care workers by a number of countries, and the United Kingdom's National Health Service has pledged officially not to recruit medical staff in countries likely to suffer shortages of such personnel.
The reasons for labour shortages in the IT and health care sectors differ significantly: in IT, they result from the sector's dynamic growth, whereas in the realm of health care they are often a reflection of poor working conditions and supply and demand policies that have been administered at a governmental level for twenty years. In many countries, the problem is not so much a shortage of nurses as a shortage of nurses willing to work under the conditions being offered them.
The rise in labour migration does not concern skilled workers alone, and some OECD member countries make extensive use of unskilled foreign labour, chiefly in agriculture, building and civil engineering, and domestic services. This is especially true in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and the United States. In some countries, a substantial proportion of these foreign workers are undocumented.
Vi sas f or seasonal workers are also very common, and on the increase in several member countries, including Germany (263 800 seasonal workers hired in 2000), Switzerland (49 300) and the United States (33 300, see Table I .1). The increase was especially significant in Germany and Switzerland, where the numbers were up by respectively 14.5% and 9% on 1999. Other European countries are also developing programmes to recruit seasonal foreign workers, namely Italy (24 500 persons in 2000), Spain (21 200 permits available in 2001), Sweden (19 400 persons in 2000), the United Kingdom (10 100 persons in 2000), Norway (9 900 persons in 2000) and France (7 900 persons in 2000). Over the long run, however, France and Switzerland stand out insofar as the number of seasonal visas granted in both countries declined throughout the 1990s. For the most part, these workers are employed in agricultural jobs.
Some countries, including Korea and Japan, issue a large number of temporary work visas to trainees, generally employed in industry. In both these countries, this entry category has risen sharply, to respectively 104 800 and 54 000 persons in 2000. For their part, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom issue "Working Holiday Maker" 4. Refer to the note for Korea (Part III of this report) to explain the huge increase in figures. 5. Both long-term and short-term permits are now dedicated to highly skilled workers or those where skills are in short supply. Most of short-term permit holders are entertainers and sports people. 6. The new data-recording system does not allow to identify the trainees separately any longer. 7. Students in full time education aged between 18 and 25. 8. The data cover the fiscal year (October to September of the indicated year). A person is counted as many times as he/she enters the country over the course of the same year. The data may well therefore be overestimated. All categories of temporary labour migration in fac t in c rea se d b etw ee n 1 999 a nd 200 0 (s e e Table I.1). For all categories combined, the rise was 24% in the United Kingdom, 21% in Germany, about 18% in Japan and 10% in Korea. In all, it was the United States that recorded the most entries of temporary workers (505 100 in 2000), but the statistics include multiple entries. In reality, it was probably Germany that issued the most temporary work permits in 2000 (331 600 permits), and in Australia that temporary labour migration was greatest in relation to employment-related migration.
d) Continued intensification of asylum-seeker flows
In OECD countries, refugees and asylum seekers do not arrive in quite the same way. Refugees generally arrive within the framework of government programmes negotiated either with specialised international organisations or with countries that are sheltering the refugees. Asylum seekers, on the other hand, most often apply for refugee status (which they do not necessarily obtain) upon arrival at the border, or after they are already inside the potential host country. In addition, OECD countries authorise certain persons, for humanitarian reasons, to remain either temporarily or on a more permanent basis.
From the mid-1980s until the early 90s (see Statistical Annex, Table A.1.3), applications for asylum rose appreciably, sometimes spectacularly (as in Austria, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States). Faced with an increasing number of asylum seekers, OECD countries reacted by speeding up the processing of applications, and by introducing restrictive measures, one of them being the extension of visa requirements to a larger number of countries (see Section I.D on migration policies). Most OECD countries also decided to restrict asylum applications, except for special cases, to persons from countries that have not signed the United Nations Conventions on refugees and on human rights, provided they have not previously passed through a country that is a signatory.
In spite of these measures, and after declining generally in the early 1990s, flows of new asylum seekers began rising again in most OECD countries from 1997 onwards, due to the combined effect of numerous regional conflicts and continuing entry restrictions.
Between 2000 and 2001, the total number of asylum requests filed in OECD member countries resumed dynamic growth, rising by approximately 9.5%. In the European Union, however, applications for asylum declined, in contrast to the pattern of the four previous years. These overall trends in fact mask sharp dispa rities across host countries between 2000 and 2001.
In 2001, and in decreasing order, it was the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, France and Canada that received the greatest number of asylum requests (see Table I .1). The United Kingdom recorded 92 000 applications for asylum in 2001, or about 4 000 more than Germany. The United States took in 86 400 asylum seekers, or roughly twice as many as France (47 300) and Canada (44 000).
T h e r i s e in a p p l ic a t i o n s f o r a s y l u m between 2000 and 2001 was also spectacular in other countries, even if the absolute numbers involved remained modest. Examples are to be found in Central and Eastern Europe, and especially the Slovak Republic (up 426% to 8 150 applications in 2001) and the Czech Republic (up 106% to 18 000 applications in 2001) and, to a lesser extent, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The aggregate number of applications for asylum in Central and Eastern European countries rose by about 76% between 2000 and 2001. The changing regional geopolitical situation, the tightening of controls in these countries and the more restrictive conditions for asylum in European Union countries all contributed to this trend.
A number of countries do stand out, however, with substantial declines in applications for asylum between 200 0 and 200 1. They are the United Kingdom (with 6 900 fewer applications recorded), the Netherlands (11 300 fewer applications), Italy (14 700 fewer applications) and Belgium (18 100 fewer applications).
Analysis of trends in asylum requests over the 1990s highlights significant differences among the main receiving countries. Some have experienced a steady increase in applications (United Kingdom, Ireland, Czech Republic), while others seem to have been affected more temporarily. This is particularly the case for Belgium, Switzerland and Italy, and to a lesser extent -because they still take in substantial numbers of asylum seekers -France, Canada and Austria. For their part, Germany, the United States and Sweden reflect a different dynamic, in that the number of asylum requests recorded in 2001 was significantly lower than the levels seen in the very early 1990s. If inflows of asylum seekers are expressed as a proportion of the total foreign population (see Table I .2), it is the Slovak Republic that ranks first (with 29%), far ahead of the Czech Republic, Ireland, Norway and Hungary, where the proportions range from 7.5% to 9%. In the United States and Australia, there were no more than three new asylum seekers per thousand of the foreign-born population in 2001. In Japan, the ratio is even significantly lower. As a percentage of the total population, inflows of asylum seekers are especially great in Austria, in Norway, in Switzerland, in Sweden, the Belgium and the Netherlands.
In terms of nationalities, the greatest number of requests recorded in the OECD countries in 2001 came from Afghans (roughly 53 000), followed by more than 50 000 requests from Iraqi citizens, 32 000 from Turks, nearly 29 000 from citizens of the former Yugoslavia and 21 000 from Chinese. The breakdown by original nationality varies sharply, however, from one host country to another (see the Statistical Annex, Not all asylum seekers obtain refugee status, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention, or in some other form (humanitarian refugee) -far from it (see Table I .2). Approval rates, computed on the basis of applications reviewed for the first time in 2001, were in fact low, and very variable from one host country to another. Approval rates are generally under 30%, but they can be much lower, as in France, where scarcely 12% of the applications examined are approved. Of the ten main receiving countries, the approval rate is highest in Canada, where it is 47%. However, the percentages also vary according to the nationalities concerned. Of the main nationalities of persons seeking asylum in the OECD countries, Afghans are most often granted refugee status (54% of the applications examined in 2001), followed by Iraqis (40%), citizens of the former Yugoslavia (25%), Iranians (22%), Chinese (19%), Russians (16%) and Turks (15%).
e) Migration: a multi-faceted panorama
Along with the traditional "big three" of family immigration, refugees and asylum seekers, and employment-related migration, the main trends of which were presented above, some more specific forms of mobility are developing. Aside from tourist visits, which strictly speaking do not constitute migration, and the seasonal movements mentioned earlier, examples include transfers of staff within multinational firms, cross-border commuters, temporary movements of skilled workers to provide services, the mobility of students, and retired persons electing to live abroad.
Student mobility was discussed in a special chapter of the previous edition of Trends in International Migration. It is tending to increase with the expansion of trade and is part of the globalisation process: first, because language skills are increasingly essential for positions of responsibility and skilled jobs; and second, because cultural experience acquired abroad is frequently viewed as an additional advantage by employers. Apart from the direct financial benefit that enrolment fees bring to institutions of higher education, foreign students constitute a potential reserve of highly skilled labour that is familiar with the rules and practices prevailing in the host country. A number of OECD countries, including Switzerland, Germany and Australia, and more recently Canada, have relaxed the rules for foreign students wishing to change their visas in order to enter the labour market after completing their studies.
In s o m e O E C D m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s , t h e number of foreign students is very high. This is especially true in the United States, but also in the United Kingdom and Germany, which respectively hosted 475 000, 223 000 and 187 000 foreign students in 2000, in all fields and at all levels of study combined (see Table I .3). France and Australia each had over 100 000 foreign students as well. The proportion of OECD member country nationals, however, varies substantially from one country to another (22.4% in Australia and 25.2% in Poland, versus 60.6% in the United Kingdom, 72.8% in Switzerland and 75.4% in Ireland). These disparities are due partly to the geographical locations of the host countries and their histories of migration, but also to strategies to attract foreign students (grants and scholarships, possibilities of entering the labour market, etc.) and specialised programmes in certain fields of study. The OECD countries are taking in an ever-increasing number of foreign students. The total stock of foreign students in the OECD area rose by nearly 15% between 1998 and 2000. The trend has been absolutely spectacular in Belgium and Sweden. The increase was also substantial in Hungary (+48%), Spain (+40%) and New Zealand (+39%).
In North America the mobility of retired people has been a long-standing feature, and in some states like Florida and California the elderly are over-represented. Large numbers of Canadian senior citizens migrate to the southern states of the USA, Mexico, Costa Rica and the island states of the West Indies, in some cases only seasonally. 1 This trend is much less advanced in Europe, though it is on an upward path and the mobility of retired people is increasingly assuming an international dimension. For example, it is estimated that of the nearly 6 million European citizens resident in an EU country other than their own, around 900 000 are aged over 60. Most of them are French, British, German or Belgian, and have settled chiefly in Spain, Portugal, Greece and, to a lesser extent, France. This migration of senior citizens would be more pronounced with the inclusion of return flows to home countries, notably Ireland and Portugal. Easier pension transfers and, in the case of Europe, the introduction of the Euro, but above all the retirement between now and 2010 of the babyboomers (probably more mobile than previous generations), are likely to accentuate this trend, though today it is still marginal.
The other types of mobility mentioned above relate to workers -more specifically, skilled workers. In particular, transfers of staff within multinational companies have increased appreciably over the past decade or so. These international movements are generally linked with new relocated investment and their purpose is to start up a new subsidiary or to supervise the transfer of know-how from the parent company. But this mobility is not one-way. It may also be from subsidiary to parent, for the purpose of repatriating specific competencies or training local personnel to take over from the expatriate managers. More generally, in these big international corporations, expatriation is seen as a key element of human resource management. Acquisition of multicultural corporate experience is thus becoming an essential requirement for access to managerial posts.
In Asia, movements of skilled workers are mostly transfers within multinational corporations. Japanese companies have invested heavily in that part of the world, relocating their activities in order to remain competitive. Expatriated Japanese nationals perform a large share of the management duties in these relocated enterprises. In the United States, inflows of foreign workers due to transfers of staff within multinational corporations almost tripled between 1995 and 2000 (see Table I .4). In 2000, about 300 000 work permits in this category were issued. A similar trend, over a longer period, is observable in nearly all OECD countries.
Cross-border workers are not statistically recorded as migrants. Yet they continuously affect the equilibrium of the employment areas in which they work. This is certainly the case in the European Economic Area where, according to the estimates available, there are over 500 000 cross-border workers out of a total of 34 million persons employed in the border zones.
2 Cross-border employment would therefore account for about 1.5% of total employment in these regions. In 2000 Switzerland alone admitted nearly 150 000 cross-border workers, more than half of them French (see Table I .5).
Luxembourg also admits a great many Belgian, French and German workers. Belgium takes in an estimated 20 000 French cross-border workers and over 6 000 Netherlands nationals. Germany, given its central location in Europe, takes in a large number of workers resident in France, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Certain estimates put the crossborder workforce in Germany at nearly 100 000. Although intra-European mobility is still low and developing slowly, a marked growth of crossborder employment is observable.
International mobility of skilled workers in s ervi c e p rovi s i on is an othe r f orm o f lab ou r m i g r a t i o n t h a t i s i n c r e a s i n g s t e e p l y. T h e movements are usually for short periods, though they may extend to several months or recur at frequent intervals. Lower transport costs and technical specialisation account for this trend. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), signed by more than 130 countries, provides for the introduction of simplified procedures to assist the temporary mobility of professionals in certain sectors (see Box I.2). However, the sta tistics generally combine these movements with those of entrepreneurs (business trips), making them very hard to identify. Ultimately, the development of electronic communication may curb service worker migration as new forms of distance working are introduced. 
f) Traditional flows and new migration movements
Chart I.3 presents a comparison for selected OECD countries of the structure and changes of inflows from the principal countries of origin. Two distinctive trends can be observed in 2000. The first is the predominance of one or two origin countries. The second is the emergence of new migration flows. I n 2000 the f i ve mai n s end ing c ountri es accounted for over 70% of total flows to Hungary and Japan, but less than one-third of the flows to Denmark and the Netherlands. The predominance of just a few origin countries in migration flows can be attributed to different causes, depending on the country concerned: geographical proximity, historical and cultural ties, or a large presence of refugees and asylum seekers. Geographical proximity would account for the high proportion of Poles in Germany, New Zealanders in Australia, Germans in Austria, French in Belgium and Luxembourg, Mexicans in the United States, Russians in Finland, Albanians in Italy and Chinese in Japan. At any given time, one in four of the main sources of outward migration is a country that has a common border with the receiving country. The existence of historical and cultural links applies particularly to Britons in Australia (and the other way round), Moroccans and Algerians in France, Angolans, Cape Verdeans and Brazilians in Portugal and Indians in the United Kingdom. Finally, the priority given to refugees by Sweden, Norway and Denmark explains the continuing inflow of migrants from countries that are the scene of persistent regional or local conflicts. All told, these three causes account for about one-third of the inflows to the receiving countries under review.
Parallel with the continuing traditional flows, new migration movements are emerging (see Box I.3) for which the cultural and linguistic links to the country of origin are more tenuous. Chart I.3 shows average inflows over the 1990s (dotted) together with those for the latest available year (in blue), making it possible to compare these two trends. For a given host country, when an area not coloured blue is shown, this indicates that the share attributed to this country of origin in overall flows is lower for the latest available year than it was on average during the 1990s. For example, while Mexico continues to be the leading source of emigration to the United States, the proportion of Mexicans in overall flows has fallen by more than 25%. A similar trend is observable for Vietnamese and Britons in Australia, Estonians in Finland, Surinamese and Turks in the Netherlands, Koreans in Japan and Portuguese in Switzerland. The trend is even more pronounced for nationals of countries of the former Yugoslavia moving to Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
Box I.2. The GATS negotiations on service provision
The General Agreement on Trade in Services, which entered into force on 1 January 1995, identifies four types of international service trade called "modes of supply". Mode 4 is the one concerning the temporary movement of natural persons. It therefore corresponds to temporary migration for purposes of employment. This may concern unincorporated entrepreneurs, employees of multinationals or foreign firms, or even businesspersons travelling on business. Permanent migration and job search are excluded, although the official definition of service suppliers does not specify a maximum length of stay.
The fourth mode of service supply was introduced into the GATS negotiations at the insistence of several developing countries, including India. A new round of negotiations on trade in services began in 2000 and should finish at the end of 2005. member countries of the World Trade Organization were able to put forward requests for amendments until 30 June 2002. Six proposals concerning Mode 4 have been put forward by Colombia, India, Canada, the European Commission, Japan and the United States respectively.
The proposals put forward by the developing countries concern the risks of brain drain and mobility of medium-or low-skilled service suppliers. The developed countries have a more ambivalent stance on Mode 4 since while anxious to protect their labour markets, they are under pressure from firms to facilitate access to foreign labour. The amendments requested by those countries concern, in particular, the definition of service suppliers, easing of access to foreign markets and the introduction of a GATS work permit. Turkey (7) Fed. Rep. of Yug. 6.4)
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. Origin of new immigrants and language skills Theme box on the Integration of Immigrants
One aspect of the increase in migration, over and above the traditional movements, is an inflow of immigrants whose cultural and linguistic links with the host country are weaker. These new populations have serious difficulties in integrating into the labour market and into society as a whole.
Even though there is still a strong element of self-selection in migration, the percentage of immigrants whose mother tongue is the same as the official language of the host country (see Table I .6) is small in most OECD countries. This does not apply so much to the United Kingdom, Portugal, Australia and New Zealand, where migrant inflows are very large, either because of a colonial past as regards the first two of those countries, or because of selection as regards the other two. France is a special case, too, and the proportion there is 6% or 73% depending on whether or not the Maghreb countries are considered to be French-speaking. The Nordic countries, whose languages are little used around the world and which take in large numbers of refugees, are a good deal more affected by linguistic problems.
In the United States, the Hispanic immigrant presence is such that it is able over the medium term to influence linguistic practice in that country (in 2000 nearly 11% of households stated that Spanish was spoken at home rather than English and 7% used other languages). In multilingual countries like Canada, Belgium and Switzerland, the mother tongue of immigrants is likewise becoming an additional issue of migration policy. In part this is why Quebec has negotiated with the Canadian federal authorities the right to select immigrants and manage migration flows to the province.
The fact of coming from a country where one of the official languages is the same as that of the host country does not necessarily guarantee proficiency in that language. Many persons from the Indian sub-continent and from francophone Africa have a very poor command of English and French.
Besides, Chiswick et al. (2002) show that in the case of Australia, language skills depend very much on the migrants' category upon entry, as refugees, for example, have a lower command of English. These differences tend to decrease after three and a half years of residence as regards the migrants' ability to speak English and, albeit to a lesser extent, their reading and writing skills in English.
A large number of OECD countries have introduced special language training programmes for immigrants (see Section I.D on migration policies). In some countries participation is compulsory, and several countries plan to make citizenship, residence and permit renewal conditional on passing of a language test. Table I .7 illustrates the emergence of new migration flows. A specific indicator has been constructed for this purpose. It is calculated by dividing, for each host country considered, the five main sending countries' share of total inflows for 2000 by their share of the total of foreigners or foreign-born. Thus, a value of 1 for a given sending country means that its share in inflows is the same as its share in the number of foreigners as a whole. This is the case for Indians in the United Kingdom and Brazilians in Portugal. If the value is greater than 1, this can be due either to immigrants from an emerging source country, or to previous waves of immigration which though persistent have had little impact on the total number of foreigners from this country. In the case of Australia and the United Kingdom, for example, the indicator is especially high for South African nationals since their share of inflows is over three times their share of the total number of foreigners. The presence of New Zealanders in Australia and Poles in Germany is not the result of a recent wave of immigration, but probably indicates sizeable new inflow s a ccompanied by l arg er outflows. Thus the indicator in the range of 3 in these two cases corresponds to an old wave of migration that has a significant to-and-fro component and/or a high turnover.
Three sending countries stand out particularly for the year 2000. These are China, India and Iraq. The same finding was reported in the previous edition of Trends in International Migration, so there is now confirmation of the emergence of new migration flows from these countries. Iraq systematically figures in flows to the Nordic countries (mainly Denmark, Norway and Sweden) with an indicator of over 2, meaning that its nationals are represented at least twice as much in immigration flows as in the total stock of foreigners. But 2001 brought a reversal of the trend, with Afghan nationals figuring increasingly in the flows of asylum seekers (see above Section A.I.1.d.). Chinese and Indian nationals figure prominently in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, although their shares of total immigrant numbers there are already high, reflecting both the continuing nature of the flows and their acceleration. The preponderance of these two nationalities of origin is in itself remarkable. Part of the explanation probably lies in the heavy flows of ICT specialists to those countries during the period under review.
Two other nationalities of origin came to the fore in 2000. Large numbers of South African nationals emigrated to Australia and the United Kingdom, and there were sizeable flows of United States nationals to France, Japan and, to a lesser degree, the Netherlands. Comparatively large numbers of Australians and New Zealanders emigrated to the United Kingdom. There was also quite a large flow of Russians to Germany, chiefly Aussiedler (Russians of German ethnic origin), confirming the continuation of East-West migration. Lastly, the big inflow of Japanese nationals to New Zealand should be noted. In 2000, nationals of Japan were represented 7.6 times more in entry flows than in the stock of foreigners.
It may be asked whether the emergence of new source countries of immigration points to a diversification of nationalities of origin or more simply to a renewal of migration trends. An argument could be made for both cases. For countries like Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States, the number of nationalities present in 50% of the immigration flow rose steeply during the 1990s, clearly indicating a diversification of sources. The number rose from 2 to 15 for the Netherlands, from 2 to 10 for the United States, and from 4 to 8 for Switzerland. By contrast, in the case of the Nordic countries, which are very responsive to requests for asylum, it would be more appropriate to speak of a renewal of flow sources. Finally, in the case of traditional immigration countries like Belgium, France and Germany, migration remains concentrated on a few nationalities that preponderate in both stocks and inflows of foreigners.
g) The case of areas of free movement between OECD countries
Within the OECD area there are three zones of free movement in which mobility and residence of nationals of the countries concerned are not officially restricted in any way. These zones are the European Union, the Nordic countries and the Trans-Tasman area formed by Australia and New Zealand. There is also the special case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which greatly facilitates temporary mobility of professionals and other skilled workers between the United States and Canada. The Treaty of Rome (1957) recognises the principle of free movement for nationals of EU countries wishing to reside or work within the area formed by the signatory states. More recently, measures have been taken to facilitate intra-European mobility. These include a directive on free movement of nonworkers, students and retired persons, and a series of directives on mutual recognition of skills and access to certain public service jobs previously reserved for nationals.
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Nevertheless, intra-European mobility is still low, especially having regard to the differences between EU labour markets. Intra-European migration involves less than 0.2% of the total population of the Union, whereas movements between the nine major census areas in the United States concern 1.5% of those regions' total population. The low mobility within Europe is partly attributable to linguistic and cultural barriers, but it is also due to structural rigidities in the labour markets of individual EU countries. In fact, though higher than intercountry migration, inter-regional mobility within EU counties is quite low as well, with 1.2% of people in work changing residence in 1999.
In 2002 the Commission launched an action plan for mobility and skills, one of the aims of which is to facilitate geographic mobility between now and 2005 by removing the remaining administrative and legal barriers, increasing the portability of supplementary pension rights of migrant workers, and improving the existing regimes of skills recognition in the regulated professions.
The number of EU nationals in immigration inflows has risen slightly in recent years, however. Table I .8 shows movements of EU citizens, by nationality, for fourteen EU countries. The last line in the table shows the proportion of foreigners from other EU countries in the total population. The five countries with the highest proportion of EU nationals in their foreign population are Luxembourg (89%), Belgium (62.2%), Spain (42.7%) and France (36.6%).
Ranking EU countries by the proportion of EU citizens in overall inflows produces very similar findings, and indicates other destinations as well. In the years 1998-99, the proportion was around 70% for Luxembourg, 51% for Portugal, 48.5% for Belgium, 47.5% for the United Kingdom and 39% for Spain. The remaining EU countries have considerably lower proportions of other EU citizens in their inflows, ranging from around 28% in the case of Denmark to 6% for France. Over 40% of EU citizens living in another country were in Germany, as against 20% in the United Kingdom. Compared to The analysis of intra-European mobility by nationality shows great diversity, largely reflecting cultural and linguistic affinities (Germans in Austria, French and Dutch in Belgium, Finns in Sweden and Swedes in Finland). Historical ties also play a role in this mobility, as is the case of Portuguese and Italians in France and of Italians in Austria.
In 1954 the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) concluded an agreement that led to the creation of the Nordic passportfree area. Nationals of third countries have to meet the entry and stay requirements of the Nordic country in which they wish to settle. In 1996, when Denmark, Finland and Sweden joined the Schengen system, Iceland and Norway, which are not EU members, negotiated co-operation agreements with the Schengen Member States, but the Nordic passport-free area was maintained.
Up until the early 1990s most of the migration within the area was to Sweden, the Nordic country with the most buoyant economy. Annual inflows of Nordic nationals averaged some 12 000 persons, half of them Finns. 3 Most of the Finnish immigrants in Sweden were young and low-skilled, whereas today's immigrants tend to be "white collar". The Danes and Swedes preferred to migrate to Norway. Although its pattern has changed, notably with the Table I .9). Norwegians predominate in Denmark, Swedes in Norway, and Finns in Sweden.
Since 1920 there has been no restriction, so to speak, on mobility between New Zealand and Australia. In 1973 the two countries signed the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, which authorises their citizens to move between New Zealand and Australia and reside and work in either country without the need for any permit. Migration between the two countries is in fact very sensitive to changes in the economic climate and dominated by the mobility of New Zealanders. Specifically, the number of New Zealanders in Australia increases during periods of economic growth and decreases during recessions. Over the past ten years, however, net migration of New Zealanders to Australia has increased continuously, rising from less than 3 000 in 1991/92 to +30 000 in 1999-2000. In March 2001 an estimated 450 000 New Zealanders were residing in Australia, of whom 251 000 had been there for more than 12 months. For purposes of comparison, the census figure for Australians resident in New Zealand in 2001 is only 56 300. In February 2001, Australia and New Zealand amended the terms of the Trans-Tasman Arrangement, which now stipulates that New Zealanders must obtain a residence permit if they wish to receive certain types of welfare benefit in Australia.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in effect since 1994, allows Canadian and Mexican professionals to come and work temporarily in the United States (TN visa) if they have a formal offer of employment. Labour certification (proof that the visa applicant is not taking a job away from a US worker) is not required. The application can be made at the border and the visa issued on the spot. There is no quota for Canadian nationals, but the number of Mexicans that can apply for the TN visa is limited to 5 500 a year. In January 2004 this limit will be abolished together with the clause on pay offers (these must be comparable to current pay levels in the United States). Consequently, migration of Mexican professionals to the United States can be expected to increase. In 2000, nearly 89 900 Canadian professionals (60 700 in 1999 and about 93 000 in 2001) and a little under 2 500 Mexicans entered the United States with TN visas. Migration of Mexicans and Americans to Canada under the TN system is on a much smaller scale, totalling no more than 10 100 persons in 2000. But the flow can be expected to increase in the years ahead.
Finally, there is the very specific case of Puerto Rico, which formally is a free state associated with the United States. Puerto Rican citizens can circulate freely in the United States and have a special status that confers all the rights and duties associated with American citizenship, except the right to vote in presidential elections. According to the 2000 census figures, Puerto Rico has a population of 3.6 million, plus about 3.4 million Puerto Ricans living in the United States. The latter represent 9% of that country's Hispanic immigrant population and a little over 1% of the immigrant total.
h) The foreign or immigrant population is increasing and diversifying…
In Australia, New Zealand and Canada, immigrants account for a large share of the resident population: 23.6% in 2000 for Australia and 19.5% for , the immigrant population rose by one million. In Australia, between 1996 and 2000, immigration increased the population by more than 600 000.
The foreign presence in the total population varies widely across the European OECD countries. In 2000 it was very large in Luxembourg (37.3%) and in Switzerland (19.3%). In the other traditional immigration countries the foreign presence ranged from 4% in the United Kingdom to 9.3% in Austria. The proportion was close to 9% in Germany and 8.5% in Belgium, as against 5.6% in France and 4.2% in the Netherlands.
In the northern European countries the proportion of foreigners in the total population ranges from The trend of stocks of immigrants or foreigners varies across countries and depends on migration policy, migrant inflows and outflows, the demographic dynamics of foreign populations, and the number of naturalisations, which reduces the stock of foreigners commensurately. In most OECD countries the number of foreigners or immigrants has risen during the past five years (see Table I .10). Between 1995 and 2000 the highest average annual growth rates for the foreign population were in Greece, Korea and Spain. Growth rates were also very high (over 5% a year) in Italy, Ireland and the Slovak Republic. Belgium, France and the Netherlands were notable exceptions, mainly because of the comparatively large number of naturalisations in those countries. In Sweden the stock of foreigners a lso decreased between 1995 and 2000, chiefly owing to naturalisations and the return of Finns to their home country.
Chart I.5 shows the distribution of all foreigners and immigrants by region of origin. The largest share is found in Europe (36%), followed by Asia (around 26%). The African and Asian continents, which respectively account for 13% and 59% of the world's pop ulation, are the ref ore very m uch und errepresented in the foreign populations of OECD countries, while Europe (13% of the world's population), is still heavily over-represented, although its share of total immigration flows is declining noticeably. Generally speaking, the size of the foreign population, broken down by nationality (see Statistical Annex, Tables B.1.4 and B.1.5), varies in each host country in accordance with migration tradition, the facilities already in place, employment opportunities and geographic proximity of the country of origin.
In the OECD countries of Europe the proportion of European immigrants increased during the 1990s with the opening of eastern borders. The same trend is perceptible in the new immigration countries of Southern Europe and certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe. By contrast, the proportion of European nationals in the foreignborn population has been decreasing in the United States and Canada, but also in Australia and New Zealand. In 1986, Europeans represented 62% of the foreign-born population living in Canada, ten years later the proportion was down to 47% and it is still falling. 
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In recent years, there have been large-scale movements of Asian persons, notably Chinese and Indians, outside their traditional areas of migration (i.e., Japan, Korea, Australia and, to a lesser extent, the United States and Canada for the Chinese; the Commonwealth countries for the Indians). The immigration statistics for the United States somewhat mask this phenomenon because of the very large presence of Latin Americans, who form an expatriate community of nearly 15 million persons in that country, but in a number of European countries the Asian inflow is very visible. Chinese form the fourth largest foreign community in Hungary, the fifth in Italy and the eighth in Spain.
The foreigners and foreign-born persons resident in OECD countries include member country nationals. Although statistical analyses rarely single them out, their number is relatively high. Nearly 45% of the foreigners and immigrants in OECD countries, taken together, come from a member country. This compares with over 70% in Belgium and Luxembourg. In Switzerland, Germany, Sweden and Australia the proportion is over 50%. It is also high in the United States (48%) because of the Mexican presence, but very much lower in Japan (5%) and the Slovak Republic (11%). The recent accession of six more countries to the OECD (the Slovak Republic in 2000, Hungary, Poland and Korea in 1996, the Czech Republic in 1995 and Mexico in 1994) has accentuated this trend.
In 2000, Turks topped the ranking by nationality of foreigners resident in European OECD countries with more than 2.6 million persons. They were followed by nationals of the former Yugoslavia (about 1.8 million), Italians (1.5 million) and Moroccans, just ahead of Portuguese (about 1 million). After Turks and nationals of Maghreb countries, Americans make up the largest non-European community in the EU. Mexica ns form the largest expatriate community in the OECD area, with over 8 million persons in the United States alone.
Demographic characteristics of the foreign or foreign-born population
The demographic structure of the foreign or foreign-born population differs from that of nationals in its age and gender composition. But specific features vary considerably across countries and in fact depend on the nature of migration flows, in particular the size of the family component, and on the dates of migration waves and the features of the main groups of migrants themselves.
In some of the major immigration countries in Europe, such as France, but also Belgium and Switzerland, and to a lesser extent Sweden and the Netherlands, the age structure for foreigners is relatively close to that for nationals and the sole distinction is that foreigners are under-represented in the 65 and over age groups (see Chart I.6). Longstanding migration and the fact that immigrants have tended to settle permanently in these countries partly explain this finding. Under-representation in the higher age groups, moreover, may be due to the numbers of naturalisations.
In Austria and Germany the recent waves of migration, following the opening up of Eastern Europe (see Part I.C), have injected a younger element into the age structure of the foreign population, at a time when low fertility rates give the age pyramids for nationals there the typical aspect of an ageing population.
More recent countries of immigration, such as those of Southern Europe and some of the Nordic countries (Finland and Norway), present a distinctive age structure for their foreign population. There is a clear preponderance of groups of working age (25-34, 35-44 and to a lesser extent 15-24), and very marked under-representation of older groups. This pattern is also visible in the United Kingdom.
The findings are more mixed in the countries of settlement (Australia, Canada and the United States). The scale of family reunion helps to ensure that the proportion of elderly people in the immigrant population is little different from that for nationals (in fact it is appreciably higher in Canada).
Apart from a few exceptions, women are underrepresented in the foreign or foreign-born population (see Chart I.6). In Switzerland, Portugal and Germany, where employment-related immigration remains predominant, the disparity between foreigners and nationals is considerable (over 5%). But some other countries, the United Kingdom and Canada, stand out with a higher percentage of women in the foreign population. A similar finding can be made for some Nordic countries, where refugees and asylum seekers make up a substantial proportion of total flows and where employment-related movements often involve women, especially in the health care sector. Germany ( Lastly, Table I .11 reflects differences in levels of education between nationals and foreigners or immigrants aged between 15 and 65, as observed in [2000] [2001] . In a number of OECD countries, over half the foreign population has not pursued education beyond the first cycle of secondary school. The proportion is as much as around 67% in France. With the exception of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, foreigners seem on average to have lesser levels of education than nationals. But the gap is less significant in the main countries of settlement, which apply a selective policy on immigration (Canada, for example). Similar observation also concern children of foreign origin (see Box I.4).
The duality of migration flows by level of education stands out sharply in the case of some member countries where foreigners or foreign-born persons are over-represented at both the highest and lowest levels of education. This is particularly the case in the United Kingdom and Canada, but also in Austria and the Nordic countries. The main immigration countries in Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland) show signs of the older waves of migration in the 1960s and 1970s, largely made up of low-skilled labour employed in the manufacturing sector.
If the above figures are compared with the 1999-2000 averages (see 2001 edition of Trends in International Migration), it will be seen that the proportion of foreigners with tertiary education has risen by more than one and a half percentage p o i n t s i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , r e f l e c t i n g increased inflows of high-skilled workers. Education levels of foreigners have also risen in Italy and Austria. But in Portugal and Greece they have declined during the past two years. This is not surprising, given the growth of employmentrelated migration of low-skilled workers to these countries.
i) … but remains very concentrated around urban areas
An initial analysis of regional data shows that patterns of foreign population distribution vary substantially across host countries. The disparities are due in part to current migration policies and the extent to which they encourage the dispersion of new immigrants throughout the country, but also to the economic structure of the country concerned (concentrated or dispersed job catchment areas, administrative and/or economic activities concentrated around a centre). Maps I.1, I.2 and I.3 show the distribution of foreign populations by large regions in Europe, as well as in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia and New Zealand.
In some European member countries of the OECD (see Map I.1), the regional concentration of the foreign population can be high, particularly in capital regions. For instance the percentage of foreigners in the total population is almost 27% in the London area and 26% in the Brussels area, 14.5% in Stuttgart and Access to education is one of the most important determining factors concerning integration into the labour market, as school performance among children of immigrants may be influenced by lack of language skills or unfavourable social and economic conditions. This may raise serious long-term issues in terms of integration of immigrants into the host society.
The PISA study (www.pisa.oecd.org) has analysed and compared the school performance of children born abroad of foreign parents (non-native or immigrant children), of native pupils of foreign-born parents (first generation) and of native children with at least one parent native-born (natives) (see Chart I.7). In most OECD member countries, immigrant children lag behind native-born children in terms of reading skills, as well as mathematics and science (not reported), although the discrepancies tend to be slightly lower in the latter two cases. The test score differences are particularly significant in Switzerland and Luxembourg and to a lesser extent in Austria, Belgium and Germany. Conversely it is quite low, if not negligible, in Canada, Australia and New-Zealand. The improvement in education attainment between non-natives and first generation students is particularly striking in the United Kingdom, illustrating either a change in the origin of foreign children or an improvement in the school performance across generations. Belgium and Denmark are the only two countries where the recorded combined reading test score is lower for first generation than for immigrant students.
Country-specific studies shed light on the complexity of this pattern. For example, according to research in the United Kingdom poor performance is not necessarily found in areas where there is a high concentration of immigrants but is often more directly affected by the school environment. Research for the United States finds that immigrant children are as likely as those native-born to enrol in primary schools but less likely to go on to high school. Research for Canada suggests that immigrant children consistently out-perform native-born children. Strong motivation among immigrant families to succeed in their new host country could be one explanation.
Most OECD countries are aware of the importance of this issue and thus provide special training, including language training, to foreign children. Nonetheless, as previously shown, difficulties in integrating into the school system also concern first generation children, for whom the educational disadvantage factors are much more difficult to identify and to cope with. Although institutional and historical situations differ from one country to another, it seems that much can be learned from the relative success of traditional settlement countries such as Australia, Canada and New-Zealand. almost 17% in Vienna. And this percentage is at least double the national average in the Paris area (13.9%), Prague (1.2%), the Balearic Islands and Madrid (5.7% and 3.1% respectively). The other OECD member countries under review (see Maps I.2 and I.3) display similar patterns, but with the particular drawing power of other important economic areas such as British Columbia in Canada, California and Florida in the United States, Sydney in Australia or Auckland in New Zealand. Italy is also interesting in that the foreign population is noticeably concentrated in the leading industrial areas to the north of the country.
The maps also reveal more specific concentrations, in particular around the borders (e.g. France and the United States), along the coast (e.g. Australia) or, in the case of Germany, between the eastern and western parts of the country.
Chart I.8 shows regional disparities in the distribution of the foreign population. The horizontal axis gives the percentage of foreigners (or immigrants in the case of host countries) in the countries under review, while the vertical axis measures regional disparities in the distribution of the foreign population. Patterns are sharply contrasted from one country to the next. Typical patterns are found in the following countries: in Europe, Spain (small share of foreigners in the total population and large regional disparities) contrasts with Germany and Austria (large number of foreigners and relatively small regional disparities); the Netherlands (share of foreigners in the total population around the European average and very small regional disparities) contrasts with the United Kingdom (share of foreigners in the total population slightly higher than the European average and very large regional disparities); and finally Belgium has a large number of foreigners and very large regional disparities. Other countries have less clear profiles. However, some can be grouped together, for instance Greece, Finland and Norway, with a relatively low number of foreigners and small regional disparities. Conversely the Czech Republic, which takes in few foreigners, has very marked regional disparities. In the case of the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Czech Republic, regional disparities are considerably attenuated if the capital region is excluded from the analysis. The same applies to Spain if the analysis excludes the Balearic Islands (region with the highest percentage of foreigners). The difference is indicated in Chart I.8 by an arrow connecting the point which includes all regions to the point which excludes the region with the highest foreign population density. In the four host countries under review (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), the immigrant population is highly concentrated in the major coastal cities, particularly in Australia and Canada but also, in the case of the United States, in entire regions that have had massive recourse to immigrant labour. Compared with the United States and Canada, however, Australia and New Zealand have a more uniform regional distribution of the immigrant population.
Chart I.9 breaks down the previous findings using a generic indicator of foreign population dispersion. Regions are classed in ascending order according to the number of foreigners they contain. The vertical axis shows the cumulative percentage of foreigners. The horizontal axis shows the cumulative percentage of the Total population (%) total population. A theoretical curve following the first bisector would show a uniform regional distribution of foreigners (i.e. the share of foreigners in each region matches the region's demographic weight). Conversely, the further the curve is from the first bisector, the more dispersed the foreign population.
In the case of the United Kingdom, France and the United States, the curve is very far from the first bisector (see Chart I.9). In particular, Inner and Outer London jointly account for almost half of the foreign population, whereas their combined demographic weight does not exceed 13%. Conversely, there is less contrast between the regional distribution of the foreign/immigrant population and that of the native population in the Netherlands but also in Germany, Australia and New Zealand. In Australia, for instance, the five most densely populated areas (around Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide) jointly account for almost 60% of the population and 77% of the immigrant population. In the United States, the immigrant population is more concentrated. Over 60% of immigrants live in the five most densely populated states (California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois), which only account for just over one-third of the total population. Other more atypical patterns are to be found in Spain, for instance, where Murcia, the Balearics and the Canary Islands are intermediate regions (i.e. not the most densely populated in terms of immigrants) where the percentage of foreigners is well above the national average. This can be seen on Chart I.9 as sharp changes in the slope of the curve.
Economic conditions and local manpower needs are certainly among the principal determinants of migrants' choice of location. At the same time family and community links, as well as the geographical proximity of the country of origin, could be considered significant influences. This would partly explain, in the case of the United States, the concentration of Asians in the Hawaiian archipelago, Mexicans in California and Texas, and Cubans in Florida. The same applies to Canada, for the Asians in British Columbia and the French in Quebec, as it does to France and Spain, for the North Africans in Corsica and the South of France and in the region of Andalusia.
The high concentration of immigrants in certain areas poses particular difficulties in terms of the accessibility of public services, the availability of housing and more generally the social integration of new arrivals (see Box I.5). In order to alleviate these Box I.5.
Integration in urban areas
Theme box on the Integration of Immigrants
The major economic and social changes that have occurred in the metropolitan areas -inner cities and suburbs -of most OECD countries since the 1950s have created new difficulties for immigrants as regards integration. In a number of OECD countries, local and national authorities are confronted with special problems caused by the concentration of immigrants in deprived neighbourhoods and labour market areas that are not sufficiently dynamic, even in periods of high growth. 1 In some cases the result has been the development of ethnic enclaves. This is particularly true of North America, but the phenomenon is also becoming increasingly frequent in the European OECD countries and especially the new immigration countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain). Some specialists maintain, however, that the concentration process can help to further the economic integration of immigrants through the development of community and ethnic activities and, in the medium term, to generate a process of spatial assimilation in which immigrants move from their enclaves to more affluent urban areas. But social integration is still uncertain in this type of scheme.
Uneven geographic distribution of the immigrant population is not necessarily the result of segregation. It may derive from a process of self-selection, with new arrivals preferring to be among their community and close to the places that can give them the special assistance they need (integration classes, specific social services, etc.). For instance, in 2000, more than 47% of new immigrants to Canada chose to settle in the urban community of Toronto.
Central governments are tending to leave the responsibility for immigrant integration to regional and municipal authorities, but they generally provide a limited amount of financial assistance. In several OECD countries, local authorities have asked for a new division of responsibilities in the management of migration flows and for larger fund transfers from central government.
1. See Immigrants, Immigration and Cities. Exploring the Links, OECD, 1998. problems, certain countries that receive many applications for political asylum have introduced variously coercive measures that have the effect of dispersing asylum seekers across the territory (e.g. Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden). Nevertheless, policies such as these have a limited impact, essentially because they only concern one category of new arrivals and do not affect the foreign population already installed. Canada and Australia have recently developed more general measures to encourage new immigrants to settle in less densely populated areas where foreigners are under-represented.
Immigration and population growth in OECD countries
Migration plays a significant role in the annual population growth of many OECD countries. First of all, the presence of a foreign or foreign-born population contributes to the natural increase in the population (excess of births over deaths). The higher the fertility of foreign women relative to indigenous women, the more significant this contribution is. Secondly, when net migration is positive, the population of the host country grows by the same amount.
a) Growth in the total and foreign populations
Chart I.10 shows the respective contributions of net migration (nationals and foreigners) and of natural increase (excess of births over deaths) to total population growth in the countries of the European Union and other OECD countries over the past three decades.
In nearly all the European OECD countries migration made the major contribution to population growth during the 1990s. But this has not always been the case. In the early 1960s, natural increase was clearly the bigger contributor, notably in the countries of Southern Europe but also in the Nordic countries. During the next two decades, natural increase and net migration followed opposite trend paths, as shown in Chart I.10 for the European Union.
For some years now, however, several European OECD countries would have seen their total population fall, were it not for an inflow of new immigrants. This has been the case in Germany since 1986, but also in Italy since 1993 and in Sweden since 1997. Among the EU countries, France is the exception in that its rate of natural increase is substantially positive and has never fallen below 3. In that country the contribution of births to total population growth remains higher than that of migration and has risen steadily since 1993. This can be explained by the fact that the fertility rate in France is higher than the European average (1.89 children per woman 4 against 1.53 for the EU in 2000) but also, somewhat more artificially, by the large number of naturalisations granted.
In 2000, the trend that had prevailed for several decades in the countries of the European Union seems to have turned around. The natural rate of increase rose significantly and, with the benefit of large immigration flows, the EU population grew by about 4 on the previous year.
The other OECD countries present a different picture. In Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and the United States, but also in Poland and the Slovak Republic, the natural rate of increase contributed at least as much and generally much more to p o p ula tio n gro w t h th an n et m ig rat io n (s e e Chart I.11). In Turkey and New Zealand the differential was particularly wide. In the United States, despite a marked decline in the natural rate of increase in the 1960s, the fertility level remains high (2.06 children per woman in 2000) and contributes greatly to the population growth rate, which is roughly three times higher than that of the EU. Canada appears to be a case apart, with a decline in net immigration and in fertility as from the late 1980s. It should be noted, though, that the two demographic components contribute equally to Canadian population growth, which remains buoyant (about 8 in 2000).
To sum up, the long-period , by region and by country) and cross-sectional (2000, by country) data show that the migration component makes the larger contribution to total population growth in many OECD countries. This is particularly the case in countries where fertility levels are low (Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain). In settlement countries like Australia, Canada and the United States, which continue to receive large numbers of immigrants each year, the predominance of family-linked immigration and the younger age structure of the new arrivals have a marked effect on the natural increase rate over the medium and long terms. In net emigration countries like Mexico, Poland and Turkey, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, natural increase continues to be the determinant of population growth. Netherlands, where the birth rate has declined less. In those last two countries, long-term settlement of immigrants and their families has helped, through foreign births, to enhance the contribution of natural increase.
b) Foreign births: a brake on demographic ageing
In a number of European OECD countries, births to foreign nationals and persons of foreign origin account for a sizeable percentage of total births. In many cases this percentage is higher than the proportion of foreigners in the total population. Foreign births contribute to the natural increase in the population and can therefore act as brake on demographic ageing. This outcome is not inevitable, however, and depends essentially on a continuing succession of migration waves. A prolonged halt to new immigration would reduce these beneficial effects considerably, given that the fertility rate of foreign women tends to converge with that of nationals.
It is difficult to obtain comparable data on foreign births, as the term "foreign" may apply to the child or to the parents. If it applies to the parents, the number of foreign births will vary according to whether the criterion adopted is the nationality of both parents, of the mother or of the father. Generally, since fertility is studied in relation to women, the nationality of reference chosen is that of the mother. In Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland, foreign births are those of children having foreign nationality. In France and Sweden, foreign births are those to female foreign nationals. In Japan they are births to parents both of foreign nationality. In England and Wales they are births to women born outside the United Kingdom.
Data based solely on births to foreign mothers are not a measure of the total number of births linked to the presence of the foreign population or the population of foreign origin. In general, the legislation on naturalisation, depending on how liberal it is, either accelerates or slows the process of absorption of foreigners into the national population and thus reduces or increases the number of foreign births.
The proportion of foreign births is high in some OECD countries (see Chart I.12). In 2000 this was the case in Luxembourg (49%) and in Switzerland (22.5%). However, in the United Kingdom (England and Wales only), Austria and Germany, foreign births accounted for no more than 10% of total births. Italy, Finland and especially Japan and Hungary all have significantly lower levels, this being largely due to the relatively small share of foreigners in the total population.
In 2000, Portugal had the highest proportion of foreign births relative to the percentage of foreigners in the total population (over 2); the share was also high in Italy and in the United Kingdom. The proportion was particularly low (less than 1) in Japan, where immigration is mostly temporary, and Belgium, where Europeans account for a large share of non-naturalised immigrants.
c) Ageing populations and migration
The combination of the demographic effects of the baby booms that marked the immediate postwar period, the fall in fertility rates that began in OECD countries from the late 1960s, and longer life expectancy, have led to a very marked acceleration of the population ageing process in virtually all OECD countries. However, this applies more to Europe and Japan than to North America.
According to demographic projections by the United Nations, the populations of the European Union and Japan are expected, between 2000 and 2050, to fall by 10% and 14% respectively, representing in all some 55 million persons (see Table I .12). For the United States the projections point to an increase in the total population, but with a rise in the proportion of elderly persons and in the dependency ratio (i.e. the number of persons aged 65 and over as a percentage of the population of working age, 20-64). These projected developments have serious implications for the sustainability of pension and benefit systems and for labour market equilibrium (see Part II). A number of research projects run by the OECD have considered the economic and fiscal impact of coming demographic trends (OECD 2001 , 2000 , 1998 , Visco 2001 . The research generally concludes that decisions are required over the medium and long terms to tackle the population challenge and preserve balance in the social protection systems, which are linked with determination of the length of working life, the level of contributions and benefits and also with productivity gains. The studies also show that it is not possible to use immigration to alleviate the effects of population ageing. Quite apart from the unrealistic increases in entry flows this would imply (see United Nations 2000), experience has shown i) that it is impossible to fully control the level of net migration and the age structure of inflows and outflows; ii) that the higher fertility attributed to foreign women declines very rapidly with the length of stay; 5 and iii) that the foreign population is also ageing (see Box I.6). Reliance on temporary work-related immigration, a solution much advocated in the 1960s, has proved to be counter-productive. Not only did immigrants fail to return to their home countries when economic conditions deteriorated after the oil shocks of the 1970s, but there are also many who, after 30 years of work abroad, will not go back for their retirement. Today the presence of foreign retirees is still limited, but it is likely to expand greatly in the coming decades, especially in countries that had massive recourse to foreign labour in the 1960s and 1970s (Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland). The German Ministry of the Interior has estimated that in 2010 there will be nearly 1.3 million foreign retirees in Germany and about 2.8 million in 2030.
This poses major problems of integration for which the host societies are as yet ill prepared. Apart from the very specific case of hostels for immigrant workers (in France more than one-quarter of the places available in these hostels are occupied by workers aged 56 and over), the special housing facilities and the persons working in the senior citizen sector are not necessarily ready to cope with an increasing number of elderly immigrants.
The difficulties are not only institutional, and immigrants themselves are not always aware of the problems they will have to face when they reach retirement age. Many of them have limited financial resources and are not homeowners. The idea that members of the family will take care of them when they are old, as is generally the custom in the country of origin, is in many cases a false one, given that host society regulations, notably where housing is concerned, do not permit this traditional form of inter-generational assistance.
In the case of wives of immigrant workers of this generation there is even more cause for concern, since they are particularly exposed to the risk of isolation and most of them have hardly any money because they have never been in gainful employment.
